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Não deve acontecer... O primeiro ministro caiu, vão colocar um cara pró-UE...Compson escreveu:Acho que a ideia do referendo foi uma boa afinal: a Grécia vai negar o pacote, dar um calote geral, cair fora do euro e ressuscitar seu dracminha pra poder fazer política monetária.
No meio de 2012 os gregos vão tomar sol muito mais felizes que seus colegas europeus...
E tem gente que acha que política monetária não é importante!
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Quem será que causou maior estrago???Compson escreveu:Isso vale duzentas crises:
Berlusconi confirma que renunciará ao cargo de premiê da Itália
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/1003 ... alia.shtml
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Acho que o Bush Jr. nos EUA. Bem ou mal, no fim do governo Clinton, os EUA tinham contas fiscais saudáveis e balanço de pagamento administrável. Além disso, embora nunca tivessem parado de se meter na vida dos outros países, tinham adotado uma postura mais cirúrgica de fazer ataques pontuais, o que é ruim, mas é melhor que a política de guerra permanente dos republicanos. O Bushinho conseguiu reverter tudo isso.Sempre Alerta escreveu:Quem será que causou maior estrago???Compson escreveu:Isso vale duzentas crises:
Berlusconi confirma que renunciará ao cargo de premiê da Itália
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/1003 ... alia.shtml
Bush Jr. nos EUA ou Berlusconi na Itália???
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FMI alerta para nova recessão em países ricos
Reuters
WASHINGTON, 11 de novembro (Reuters) - O Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) alertou nesta sexta-feira (11) que há um risco elevado de que as economias avançadas retornem à recessão, a não ser que as autoridades atuem com urgência para chegar a políticas que impulsionem o crescimento.
Em nota preparada para a cúpula do G20 em Cannes, na França, mas divulgada apenas nesta sexta-feira, o FMI informou que a recuperação econômica nos países avançados continua em "marcha lenta".
"A paralisia política e a incoerência contribuíram para exacerbar a incerteza, a perda de confiança e aumentou o estresse no mercado financeiro", informou o FMI.
O fundo argumentou que as economias avançadas precisam urgentemente implementar planos fiscais de médio prazo que tenham credibilidade e apresentar mais reformas para o setor financeiro. Nas principais economias emergentes, os governos devem permitir uma valorização cambial mais rápida.
Em particular, o FMI informou que há uma "incerteza considerável" sobre como será alcançada a sustentabilidade fiscal nos Estados Unidos, no Japão e em alguns países da zona do euro.
"Para reduzir essa incerteza essas economias precisam caminhar mais rapidamente para colocar em prática planos críveis de consolidação no médio prazo, que ajudem a preservar o espaço para um suporte fiscal de curto prazo para a recuperação", acrescentou o FMI.
http://economia.uol.com.br/ultimas-noti ... ricos.jhtm
Nobel de Economia pede que Banco Central Europeu compre dívida italiana
EFE
O economista Paul Krugman, vencedor do Prêmio Nobel em 2008, aconselhou os europeus a ligarem a máquina de imprimir dinheiro do Banco Central Europeu (BCE) e comprar tanta dívida italiana quanto for necessário para resolver a crise da zona do euro. "No final, o BCE olhará para o precipício e dirá: esqueçamos todas as regras, temos que comprar dívida", declarou Krugman em entrevista publicada nesta sexta-feira (11) pelo jornal econômico "Handelsblatt", na qual comentou que o preço da decomposição da zona do euro seria grande demais.
"Não nos encontramos diante do ano da hiperinflação alemã de 1923", afirmou Krugman, acrescentando que "em situações extremas é preciso romper as regras". Krugman ressaltou que os países da zona do euro e o BCE se veem inevitavelmente abertos a evitar a pior opção possível que seria a saída da Itália da zona do euro e um assalto em massa dos italianos aos bancos.
Nesse sentido, adverte que isso contagiaria imediatamente a Espanha e depois a França com a consequência que "o euro acabaria se transformando um marco alemão ampliado", concluiu o economista americano.
http://economia.uol.com.br/ultimas-noti ... liana.jhtm
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Papers e apresentações da conferência “Crisis in the Eurozone” podem ser encontradas no site abaixo:The crisis in the eurozone
The continent is destroying the weak to protect the strong. But will that be enough?
By James K. Galbraith
The eurozone crisis is a bank crisis posing as a series of national debt crises and complicated by reactionary economic ideas, a defective financial architecture and a toxic political environment, especially in Germany, in France, in Italy and in Greece.
Like our own, the European banking crisis is the product of over-lending to weak borrowers, including for housing in Spain, commercial real estate in Ireland and the public sector (partly for infrastructure) in Greece. The European banks leveraged up to buy toxic American mortgages and when those collapsed they started dumping their weak sovereign bonds to buy strong ones, driving up yields and eventually forcing the whole European periphery into crisis. Greece was merely the first domino in the line.
In all such crises the banks’ first defense is to plead surprise – “no one could have known!” – and to blame their clients for recklessness and cheating. This is true but it obscures the fact that the bankers pushed the loans very hard while the fees were fat. The defense works better in Europe than in the U.S. because national boundaries separate creditors from debtors, binding the political leaders in German and France to their bankers and fostering a narrative of national-racism (“lazy Greeks,” “feckless Italians”) whose equivalent in post-civil rights America has been largely suppressed.
Underpinning banker power in Creditor Europe is a Calvinist sensibility that has turned surpluses into a sign of virtue and deficits into a mark of vice, while fetishizing deregulation, privatization and market-driven adjustment. The North Europeans have forgotten that economic integration always concentrates industry (and even agriculture) in the richer regions.
As this process unfolds the Germans reap the rents and lecture their newly indebted customers to cut wages, sell off assets, and give up their pensions, schools, universities, healthcare – much of which were second-rate to begin with. Recently the lectures have become orders, delivered by the IMF and ECB, demonstrating to Europe’s new debt peons that they no longer live in democratic states.
The U.S. advantage
The eurozone’s architecture makes things worse in two major ways. While the EU has long paid some compensation to its poorer regions, these structural funds were never adequate and are now blocked by unmeetable co-pay requirements. And the zone lacks the inter-regional redistribution channels to households that the U.S. has developed in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, federal government payrolls and military contracting among other things. Nor do German retirees settle in Greece or Portugal in large numbers as New Yorkers do in Florida or Michiganders in Texas.
Second, the ECB refuses to solve the crisis at a stroke, which it could do by buying up the weak countries’ bonds and refinancing them. The argument against this is called “moral hazard,” buttressed by old-fashioned inflation fears, but the real issue is that to do so would admit loss of control by creditors over the central bank. Actions parallel to those taken by the Federal Reserve – nationalizing the entire commercial paper market, for instance – would repel the ECB, even though it does buy up sovereign bonds when it has to. So instead the zone has gone about creating a gigantic toxic CDO called the European Financial Stability Fund, which may shortly be turned into an even more gigantic toxic CDS (like AIG, they will call it “insurance”). This may defer panic at most for a little while.
Technical solutions exist. The most-developed of these is the “Modest Proposal” of Yanis Varoufakis and Stuart Holland, widely backed by older political leaders in Europe. It would 1) convert the first 60 percent of GDP of every eurozone country’s debt to a common European bond, issued by the ECB; 2) recapitalize and Europeanize the banking system, breaking the hammerlock of national banks on national politicians; and 3) fund a New Deal-like program of investment projects through the European Investment Bank.
Variant proposals include Kunibert Raffer’s call for a sovereign insolvency regime modeled on the U.S. municipal bankruptcy statute, Thomas Palley’s proposal for a new “government banker” and Jan Toporowski’s proposal for a tax on bank balance sheets to retire excess public debt.
These are the best ideas and none of them will happen. Europe’s political classes exist these days in a vise forged by desperate bankers and angry voters, no less in Germany and France than in Greece or Italy. Discourse is sealed off from fresh ideas and political survival depends on kicking cans down roads so that the fact that this is a banking crisis does not have to be faced. The fate of the weak is at best incidental. Thus every meeting of finance ministers and prime ministers yields treacherous half-measures and legal evasions.
The latest example was the pretzel-logic that declared a 50 percent haircut on Greek debt to be “voluntary” so that it would not trigger default clauses on the CDS to which some American banks, in particular, might be exposed. When Timothy Geithner warned the Europeans of potential “catastrophe” last month one may reasonably infer he had this risk – and not the minor effect on our already disastrous jobs picture – in mind. But of course if the haircut can be declared voluntary, then CDS are not worth the storage space they occupy in bankers’ computers, and another prop to the rapidly failing market in sovereign debts falls to the ground.
Political fragility also explains the fury in France and Germany when George Papandreou [the calmest man in Europe, by the way, having been born and raised in Minnesota] sought to cut the knot of his rebellious ministers, irresponsible opposition and angry public by putting the latest austerity package to a vote. God help the bankers! The move was fatal to Papandreou in short order, and Greece will now be turned over to a junta of creditors’ deputies if such can be found willing to take the job. It won’t be anyone who wants to continue to live in Greece afterward.
Greece and Ireland are being destroyed. Portugal and Spain are in limbo, and the crisis shifts to Italy – truly too big to fail – which is being put into an IMF-dictated receivership as I write. Meanwhile France struggles to delay the (inevitable) downgrade of its AAA rating by cutting every social and investment program.
If there were an easy exit from the Euro, Greece would be gone already. But Greece is not Argentina with soybeans and oil for the Chinese market, and legally exit from the Euro means leaving the European Union. It’s a choice only Germany can make. For the others, the choice is between cancer and heart attack, barring a transformation in Northern Europe that not even Socialist victories in the next round of French and German elections would bring.
So the cauldrons bubble. Debtor Europe is sliding toward social breakdown, financial panic and ultimately to emigration, once again, as the way out, for some. Yet – and here is another difference with the United States – people there have not entirely forgotten how to fight back. Marches, demonstrations, strikes and general strikes are on the rise. We are at the point where political structures offer no hope, and the baton stands to pass, quite soon, to the hand of resistance. It may not be capable of much – but we shall see.
James K. Galbraith organized a conference on the “Crisis in the Eurozone” at the University of Texas at Austin on November 3-4. Papers and presentations can be found at http://***********, along with a video nonono of the full meeting
http://www.salon.com/2011/11/10/the_cri ... singleton/
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http://economia.uol.com.br/ultimas-noti ... s-eua.jhtmPetróleo sobe em NY com mudanças no bombeamento dentro dos EUA
SÃO PAULO - Os contratos futuros de petróleo seguiram em direções opostas nos mercados de Nova York e Londres nesta quarta-feira. O WTI fechou cotado acima de US$ 100 o barril pela primeira vez desde junho, diante da queda dos estoques americanos da commodity e também com a notícia sobre mudanças na distribuição do óleo no país. Já o Brent recuou, refletindo as preocupações com o desaquecimento da economia europeia.
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http://www.fdp-mainz.de/portal.presse.php?id=16384Guido Westerwelle escreveu:Some argue the euro can be saved only at the price of sacrificing monetary stability. This would be a momentous mistake. Putting the European Central Bank’s printing presses to work might at best bring some short-term relief. But it would have dire consequences, both raising inflation and dissipating vitally important incentives for reform. In the end we would end up with a depreciated currency and an even more destabilised eurozone. The European Central Bank’s independence and firm commitment to price stability are of paramount importance to Europe´s economy.
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Q: Thank you very much. Before we sign off, could I just take the opportunity to ask you what you think the prospects are for the attempts in Europe to create a common currency area? Are you optimistic about their success?
A: I think it's a big gamble and I'm not optimistic. Unfortunately, the Common Market does not have the features that are required for a common currency area. A common currency area is a very good thing under some circumstances, but not necessarily under others. The United States is a common currency area. Australia is also a common currency area. The characteristics that make Australia and the United States favourable for a common currency are that the populations all speak the same language or some approximation to it; there's free movement of people from one part of the country to the other part, so there's considerable mobility; and there's a good deal of flexibility in prices and to some extent in wages. Finally, there's a central government which is large relative to the local state governments so that if some special circumstances affect one part of the country adversely, there will be flows of funds from the centre which will tend to offset that.
If you look at the situation in the Common Market, it has none of those features. You have countries with people all of whom speak different languages. There's very little mobility of people from one part of the Common Market to another. The local governments are very large compared to the central government in Brussels. Prices and wages are subject to all sorts of restrictions and control.
The exchange rates between different currencies provided a mechanism for adjusting to shocks and economic events which affected different countries differently. In establishing the common currency area, the Euro, the separate countries are essentially throwing away this adjustment mechanism. What will substitute for it?
Perhaps they will be lucky. It may be that events, as they turn out in the next 10 or 20 years, will be common to all the countries; there will be no shocks, no economic developments that affect the different parts of the Euro area asymmetrically. In that case, they'll get along fine and perhaps the separate countries will gradually loosen up their arrangements, get rid of some of their restrictions and open up so that they're more adaptable, more flexible.
On the other hand, the more likely possibility is that there will be asymmetric shocks hitting the different countries. That will mean that the only adjustment mechanism they have to meet that with is fiscal and unemployment: pressure on wages, pressure on prices. They have no way out. With a currency board, there is always the ultimate alternative that you can break the currency board. Hong Kong can dismantle its currency board tomorrow if it wants to. It doesn't want to and I don't think it will. But it could. But with the Euro, there is no escape mechanism.
Suppose things go badly and Italy is in trouble, how does Italy get out of the Euro system? It no longer has a lira after whatever it is - 2000 or 2001 - so it's a very big gamble. I wish the Euro area well; it will be in the self-interest of Australia and the United States that the Euro area be successful. But I'm very much concerned that there's a lot of uncertainty in prospect.
Milton Friedman, 17/Jul/1998
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